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IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1980

No. 80-1474

ANDREW J. WINSTON, Sheriff,
City of Richmond,

Aubrey M. Davis, Commonwealth's Attorney
for the City of Richmond,

CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND
DIVISION I

Petitioners,

v.

JOSEPH G. MOORE, JR.

Respondent.

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

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Richmond, VA 23219

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Respondent adopts the Appendix of Petitioners as amplified by Respondent's Statement of the Case and Appendix herein included.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AMENDMENTS V AND XIV

AMENDMENT V

> No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.

AMENDMENT XIV

> All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

With the exception of the first two paragraphs of Petitioners' Statement of the Case, Respondent disagrees with Petitioners' Statement of the Case, in that Petitioners have misstated the facts and have omitted relevant facts.

Prior to recessing on March 10, 1980, the trial Court had not been made aware of any sickness on the part of any juror. To the contrary, the only communication sent to the Court by

the jury was that two of the jurors did not desire to deliberate any further that day and wished to go home. (Appendix p.3.) Moreover, the Court's chastisement of the two jurors on the next day for requesting to be excused at 6:00 o'clock p.m. on the previous day contradicts the allegations concerning the two jurors (Appendix pp. 6-8.)

To the extent that the Petitioners' Statement of the Case alleges that no objection was made to the declaration of a mistrial, the same is not disputed. However, the Petitioners fail to state that during the course of the trial when the trial Court made an erroneous ruling of law with respect to the admissibility of character evidence and counsel for the Respondent attempted to address the Court, the Court called counsel and the prosecutor to the Bench and threatened counsel for the Respondent with a citation for contempt should he make any further interruptions, all out of the presence of the court reporter. Furthermore, counsel for Respondent was never afforded an opportunity to object, and any objections after the declaration of a mistrial would have been highly inappropriate as will more clearly appear in this Brief in Opposition. Moreover, the statement that the jury was hung "when the foreman said it was hung," is totally unsupported by the facts or by the record. (Appendix, p. 6).

Prior to the scheduled third trial, the Respondent never filed any Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond. He filed a Motion to Dismiss the indictment on the grounds that the third trial would violate his rights under the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The Motion to Dismiss was filed well in advance of the trial date. It was mailed to the trial Court on March 24, 1980, with the request that if the Court desired oral argument, Respondent wanted to have the argument as soon as possible so as to be in a position to apply for appropriate habeas relief in the unforeseeable event that the Court overruled the Respondent's Motion (Appendix, pp. 9-11). Notwithstanding the Petitioner's request for an early hearing, the trial Court scheduled the hearing for 3:30 o'clock p.m., on April 15, 1980, that being the eve of the scheduled third trial on April 16, 1980. (Appendix, p. 12).

Because of the Court's questionable action in scheduling argument on the Respondent's Motion to Dismiss the indictment at 3:30 o'clock p.m. on April 15, 1980, the Petitioner was compelled to file a Petition in the United States District Cou for the Eastern District of Virginia, Richmond Division, asking for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, United States Code, Section 2254, and injunctive relief

to avoid being tried a third time. That Court entered a temporary restraining Order and, with the acquiescence of the Attorney for the Commonwealth of Virginia, a plenary hearing was scheduled for 9:00 o'clock a.m., on April 17, 1980.

Interestingly, no answer was filed to the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, and the allegations therein contained were admitted. (The Petition is contained in Appendix, pp. 13-19.)

Of even greater significance, at the hearing on the request for a temporary restraining Order, the Petitioners agreed that the cases of United States v. Lansdown, 460 F.2d 164 (4th Cir., 1972); United States ex. rel. Russo v. Superior Court of New Jersey, 483 F.2d 7 (3rd Cir., 1973), cert. denied 414 U.S. 873 (1973); and United States ex. rel. Webb v. Court of Common Pleas, 516 F.2d 1034 (3rd Cir., 1975), were the controlling law. (Transcript of hearing before The Honorable D. Dortch Warriner, April 16, 1980, page 46, 47, 48)(Appendix, pp. 20-23).

I. RESPONDENT WAS SUBJECTED TO DOUBLE JEOPARDY WHEN THE TRIAL COURT DECLARED A MISTRIAL ON MARCH 11, 1980.

The Petitioner agrees that the leading case relating to double jeopardy decided by this Court is United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 579, 6 L.Ed. 165 in which the Court stated clearly that when a jury is discharged by the trial Court from giving a verdict upon an indictment, there must either be (1) a manifest necessity for the act; or (2) the ends of public justice

would otherwise be defeated. If the jury is discharged in the absence of manifest necessity, then retrial of the defendant is barred by the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Fifth Amendment proscription against twice putting a defendant in jeopardy for the same offense has been held to be enforceable against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment in the case of Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed. 2d 707 (1969).

In spite of its consistent reiteration of the standard of manifest necessity, this Court has explicitly and consistently refused to elaborate on the manifest necessity standard by not establishing precise rules to govern what factual contexts present a manifest necessity that would require or allow a trial court to dismiss a jury without rendering a verdict on an indictment, while at the same time allowing a retrial of the defendant without running afoul of the Fifth Amendment's proscription against double jeopardy.

The Petitioners attempt to obscure this fact in their Petition by citing a series of United States Supreme Court cases which deal with the propriety of declaration of mistrial, but none of which involved a declaration of mistrial because of a deadlocked jury. Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949), reh'g denied 337 U.S. 921 (1949) (witnesses unable to attend court-martial due to military tactical situtation); Gori v. United

States, 367 U.S. 364 (prejudicial impact upon jury from improper questioning by prosecutor); United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 (1971) (failure of prosecution to adequately warn witnesses of their Fifth Amendment rights); Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497 (1978) (improper comments by defense counsel during opening statement).

The Petitioners' citation of the above listed cases is in direct contradiction of the position taken by them in the District Court that United States ex. rel. Webb v. Court of Common Pleas, supra, United States ex. rel. Russo v. Superior Court of New Jersey, supra, and United States v. Lansdown, supra, are the controlling law in the case at bar. This inconsistent and contradictory tactic should be sufficient standing alone to counteract the Petitioners'reliance upon the cases cited by them, inasmuch as they, through their concessions in the District Court, made Webb, Russo and Lansdown the controlling law in the case at bar.

The Petitioners' cases, however, are easily distinguishable from the instant case, and while they accurately state the law as it applies to the declaration of a mistrial in certain unique cases, none of them sheds any further light on the standards of review to be employed when the propriety of a declaration of mistrial for jury deadlocked is challenged.

Each of the cases cited by Petitioners dealt with specific factual circumstances, different from the ones presented in the

instant case, where a trial court had declared a mistrial, and in each case the Court applied the "manifest necessity" principal first enunciated in Perez. The application of Perez standards to factual contexts totally dissimilar to the case at bar can shed no light on the propriety of the state Court's action in the case at bar. The Petitioners have cited these cases in an effort to lend support to their contention that the trial judge should be granted a degree of discretion that would be tantamount to refusing completely to review the actions of the trial Court. This is in direct contradiction of the language of the Court in Arizona v. Washington, supra, the most recent of the cases cited by the Petitioners:

> "Unlike the situation in which the trial has ended in an acquittal or conviction, retrial is not automatically barred when a criminal proceeding is terminated without finally resolving the merits of the charges against the accused. Because of the variety of circumstances that may make it necessary to discharge a jury before a trial is concluded, and because those circumstances do not invariably create unfairness to the accused, his valued right to have the trial concluded by a particular tribunal is sometimes subordinate to the public interest in affording the prosecutor one full and fair opportunity to present his evidence to an impartial jury. Yet in view of the importance of the right, and the fact that it is frustrated by any mistrial, the prosecutor must shoulder the burden of justifying the mistrial if he is to avoid the double jeopardy bar. His burden is a heavy one." 434 U.S. at p. 497 (emphasis added).

The United States Circuit Courts of Appeals have often addressed themselves to the specific factors to be considered

in determining whether a trial Court's discharge of a jury for inability to render a verdict meets the manifest necessity test first articulated in United States v. Perez.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in United States v. Lansdown, 460 F.2d 164 (4th Cir., 1972), was called upon to render a decision in a case that was very similar factually to the case at bar.

In Lansdown, the Court held that no manifest necessity for the declaration of mistrial existed, and remanded the case for entry of an order dismissing the indictment. The following exerpt from page 169 of Lansdown speaks directly to the issues raised by the instant case and would seem to dispose of the issues in favor of the Petitioners:

> "While the length of deliberations is a relevant factor, the more important consideration is whether there is a possibility that the jury can reach a verdict within a reasonable time. The most reliable source as to this information is the jury itself. The conclusion that a jury is unable to reach a verdict must be supported by something in addition to the trial court's conclusion that the jury has deliberated long enough."
>
> "We conclude that there was no 'manifest necessity' in this case for declaring a mistrial when the district court did so. The district court, without considering any other factors, simply concluded that approximately 11 hours of deliberation, in a case presenting a close question of credibility was long enough. The district judge did not seek the opinion of counsel or the defendant; after having told the jury that it could be 'leisurely in its deliberations,' he made no inquiry as to whether the jury was about to reach a verdict or thought that a verdict was possible."

The Circuit Courts have isolated several factors to be considered in determining the propriety of a trial judge's declaration of a deadlocked jury. They are as follows:

1. A timely objection by the defendant;
2. The jury's collective opinion that it cannot agree;
3. The length of the deliberations of the jury;
4. The length of the trial;
5. The complexity of the issues presented to the jury;
6. Any proper communications which the judge has had with the jury; and
7. The effects of possible exhaustion and the impact which coercion of further deliberations might have on the verdict.

These factors have been specifically adopted in their entirety by at least two Circuits, Arnold v. McCarthy, 566 F.2d 1377, 1386-87 (9th Cir., 1978); United States v. Horn, 583 F.2d 1124, 1127 (10th Cir., 1978), and all other circuits that have considered the question have isolated some or all of these factors as significant in determining whether discharge of a jury was required by manifest necessity, United States v. Gordy, 526 F.2d 631, 635-36, (5th Cir., 1976); United States ex rel. Russo v. Superior Court of New Jersey, 438 F.2d 7, 16 (3rd Cir., 1973); cert. denied 414 U.S. 1023; United States v. Goldstein, 479 F.2d 1061, 1068 (2nd Cir., 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 873; United States v. Lansdown, 460 F.2d 164, 1970. (4th Cir., 1972). It is interesting to note that, while this Court has remained silent as to the specific factors to be

considered in making the determination of manifest necessity, it has denied certiorari in the only two cases listed above in which there was an application for a writ.

In United States ex rel. Webb v. Court of Common Pleas, 516 F.2d 1034 (3rd Cir., 1975), the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed a District Court's denial of a writ of habeas corpus upon finding that the state trial court's decision to discharge a second jury was based on a record that did not sufficiently reflect that discontinuation of the proceedings was a manifest necessity or that the ends of public justice would not be served by continuation of the proceedings.

As in the case at bar, the defendant had been previously tried, and the first trial had terminated with a declaration of a deadlocked jury. The defendant was charged with participating in the robbery of a church rectory. At the second trial, two of the clergymen who had been in the rectory at the time of the robbery identified the defendant as one of the robbers. The defendant, on the other hand, presented testimony that he had spent the evening at some friends' apartment until 11:00 p.m., the approximate time of the robbery. At that time, he claimed he returned to his own apartment, across the hall from where he had been visiting, where he stayed with his wife and children for the remainder of the night.

The second trial lasted for six days, with the jury commencing deliberations at 10:37 a.m. on the sixth day. At 2:13

p.m. the jury returned to the courtroom for additional instructions. They recommenced deliberations at 2:35 p.m. At 5:43 p.m. the judge, on his own initiative, asked the jury to return to the courtroom. A short colloquy between the trial court and the jury foreman demonstrated that the foreman did not believe the jury could reach a verdict. At that time, the Court discharged the jury. The jury had deliberated for approximately 6-1/2 hours. 516 F.2d at pp. 1035-1036.

Among the factors which the appellate court found significant in determining that the discharge of the jury was not dictated by manifest necessity, was the fact that the trial judge did not consult with or inform either counsel prior to dismissing the jury.

Significantly, a second factor heavily relied upon by the appellate court was that the trial court directed its interrogatories solely to the jury foreman, and only the jury foreman responded. The trial court did interrogate the foreman to determine that the foreman believed that the jury would not be able to reach a verdict, which was a step significantly beyond the trial court's action in the instant case. (Appendix, p. 6). Yet the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in Webb, still held that the trial court had not gone far enough in its interrogation, because it had failed to determine the collective opinion of the jury as to whether it was in fact deadlocked.

Finally, the Court placed great weight upon the fact that this was the second trial of the defendant, and that previously another jury had been discharged for inability to reach a verdict:

> "A final factor supporting the prohibition of further proceedings against Webb with regard to the accusations here is the earlier discharge of the jury at the first trial. Thus the Commonwealth has already twice subjected Webb to 'the heavy personal strain which a criminal trial represents for the individual defendant.' The existence of the prior proceedings, which were known to the second court, mandated the exercise of even greater caution before depriving Webb of the opportunity 'of being able, once and for all, to conclude his confrontation with society through the verdict' of the jury then sitting." 516, F.2d at p. 1045."

In the case of United States v. Horn, 583 F. 2d 1124 (10th Cir., 1978) the defendants were charged with submitting false tax exemption statements to employers. The case was tried as to both defendants over a two-day period, and at 5:30 p.m. on the second day, the jury retired to deliberate. After two short interruptions, at which times the jury asked for clarifications from the trial judge, the jury sent a note, signed by its foreman, stating that "The jury appears to be deadlocked." The note was sent at 8:57 p.m.

The Court recessed the jury for the evening. The jury reconvened at 9:00 a.m. on the following morning at which time the judge gave them the Allen charge before sending them to the jury room for further deliberations. After something more than

another hour of deliberation, the judge brought the jury back into the courtroom at 10:40 a.m. At that time, the judge declared a mistrial:

> "I am now going to do what I should have done last evening when I received your note that you were deadlocked. I perhaps should have at that time declared a mistrial but I thought maybe going home and sleeping upon it, being a little fresher this morning and maybe you might break the deadlock but you have been out an hour this morning and have not so I am going to declare a mistrial." 583 F.2d at p. 1125."

The Court made no inquiry of the foreman or of individual jurors.

The Court held that the trial judge's failure to question the jury foreman as well as the jury, either individually or as a group, and his failure to ascertain whether all the members of the jury believed that they were deadlocked, prevented the trial court from making an accurate determination as to whether a manifest necessity existed for declaring a mistrial. That being the case, the appellate court held that retrial of the defendant was barred by the double jeopardy clause. 583 F.2d at p. 1129.

Arnold v. McCarthy, 566 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir., 1978) is an instructive case, in that it outlines the proper procedure for a trial court to follow in determining whether a jury is, in fact, deadlocked, and thus a declaration of mistrial manifestly necessary.

The jury had deliberated for twelve hours when it returned to the courtroom, unable to reach a verdict. At that time, the trial court questioned the jury foreman, who stated that he believed the jury was deadlocked, and it questioned the jury as

a group to determine whether they actually felt there was no reasonable probability of reaching a verdict. Only one juror indicated that he thought a verdict could be reached. 566 F. 2d at p. 1386.

In holding that the trial court's declaration of a mistrial was proper, the Court enumerated the seven factors herein cited on page 10, and then found that the most critical factor was the jury's own statement that it was unable to reach a verdict.

The similarities between the case at bar and Webb, supra, and Horn, supra, discussed above are obvious. As a matter of fact, there was at least evidence of jury deadlock in Webb and in Horn. In the instant case, there is no evidence of jury deadlock whatsoever. Similarly, the distinctions between the case at bar and Arnold, supra, further underline the Court's failure in the instant case to exercise the requisite effort to determine if a manifest necessity did indeed exist for declaring a mistrial. This can be more readily seen by applying the facts of the case at bar to the seven factors set forth in Arnold v. McCarthy, supra, and United States v. Horn, supra, for determining whether the declaration of a deadlocked jury was proper.

A. Timely objection by the defendant. It is interesting to note that the courts have determined that an objection by the defendant to the discharge of the jury is not a prerequisite to a plea of former jeopardy based on improper jury discharge.

Rather, it is only a factor to be considered in conjunction with the other facts and circumstances of the case.

In the instant case, the Respondent was never afforded an opportunity to make a timely objection to the discharge of the second jury. The jury returned to the courtroom without consultation with counsel. Counsel had no idea why the jury was being returned to the courtroom. At that point, the Court engaged in a short colloquy, set forth on page 5 of the Appendix. The Court immediately discharged the jury.

In the case of United States ex. rel. Russo v. Superior Court of New Jersey, 483 F.2d 7 (3rd Cir., 1973), the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit was faced with a factual situation identical to the one outlined in the paragraph above. It concluded that the defendant's counsel was not afforded any opportunity to object to the discharge of the jury and that the defendant could not be penalized therefor.

> "In addition, the trial judge stated at the hearing that appellant's (defendant's) counsel did not object while the jury was in the box and that he only objected as an "afterthought." While the better practice may be to object as soon as counsel learns that a mistrial is to be granted, appellant's counsel was in a difficult situation. He had no advance warning or notice that a mistrial was to be declared; ..... The Supreme Court's conclusion in United States v. Horn, 400 U.S. at 487, 91 S.Ct. 547, 558, may also be applicable in this situation:
>
> > '[I]ndeed, the trial judge acted so abruptly in discharging the jury that, had the prosecutor been disposed to suggest a continuance, or the defendant to object to the discharge of the jury, there would have been no opportunity to do so.'

"Also, to have objected in front of the jury might have prejudiced the appellant for trying to 'show up' the trial judge, especially if some members of the jury actually did want to go home despite their civic obligation. In this situation, we cannot penalize appellant for failing to object sooner." 483 F.2d at p. 17. (Emphasis added; citations omitted.)

B. The jury's collective opinion that it cannot agree.

The common thread running through all cases involving jury deadlock is that the most critical factor in determining the manifest necessity for declaring a mistrial is the collective jury opinion that it is hopelessly deadlocked. If the jury collectively agrees that it is deadlocked, then the jury should properly be discharged.

Merely interrogating the jury foreman is not enough, however. In Webb, supra, the Court conducted a short interrogation of the jury foreman that went significantly further than the interrogation conducted by the trial court of the jury foreman in the instant case.

In the case at bar, no effort was made by the trial court to determine the beliefs of any of the jurors. The following language from the Webb opinion is particularly applicable in the instant case, and would seem sufficient to dispose of the issue of manifest necessity, in favor of the Respondent, in and of itself.

"In any event there is no clear showing that the foreman's responses [to the trial judge's questions] here necessarily represented the unanimous opinion of the jury, or even that of a majority of the panel. The record, therefore, especially

with regard to an adjudication affecting constitutional rights, does not furnish an adequate showing that it was the collective sentiment of the jury that they had reached an impasse." 516 F.2d at 1044."

C. Any proper communication which the Judge has had with the jury.

There is no evidence in the case at bar of any relevant communication between the trial judge and the jury other than the colloquy between the trial court and the jury foreman immediately prior to the jury's discharge. Thus, this factor sheds no light on the question of manifest necessity for declaration of a mistrial in the instant case.

The hearing, held on April 15, 1980, more than one month after the previous trial and less than 24 hours prior to the scheduled third trial of the Respondent, amounts to nothing more than an attempt by the Petitioners to lift themselves up by their own bootstraps and thereby confuse the issues in an attempt to justify their position. The hearing held before the state Court trial judge, was conducted for the ostensible purpose of ruling on Petitioner's Motion to Dismiss the indictment, based on the same grounds for which he ultimately successfully sought habeas relief. As the trial judge must have been aware, on March 11, 1980, of the reasons why he declared a mistrial due to jury deadlock, any after-the-fact hearing to determine what those reasons were would appear to be totally irrelevant to the issue at hand, and could serve no purpose other than to futilely attempt to cure a glaring deficiency in the record of the trial.

One final alleged fact elicited at the hearing of the trial court on April 15, 1980, upon which the Court stated that it relied in declaring a mistrial was that one of the jurors had been tried by the Court on a drug charge "some years earlier" and that because of the effect of the Virginia expungement statute that juror had not been convicted. The trial court stated that this led to its strong feeling that "the jury was hung when the foreman said it was hung." (Appendix, p. 4). Of course, the foreman never said that the jury was hung. (Appendix, p. 6).

It is impossible to imagine what relevance the prior trial on a drug charge of one of the members of the jury could have had on a determination of whether the jury in the case at bar was deadlocked. Was the juror in question more apt to vote for acquittal or more apt to vote for conviction? Was the jury "leaning" toward acquittal or conviction? (At a later time, it was learned that the jury had, in fact, voted 10-2 for acquittal immediately prior to being dismissed.) What impact could the fact that one juror had previously been tried, but not convicted, of a crime by the trial court have had on the jury's deliberations? The answer, of course, is that the record is devoid of any evidence that might answer these questions. Once again the Petitioners have asked this Court to idly speculate in hindsight, what that impact might have been. It is precisely this sort of speculation that the manifest necessity standard was intended to prevent.

The trial Court, of course, could have dismissed the juror in question, sua sponte, when the jury was first impanelled. The Court, however, chose not to do this. It could also have informed the Commonwealth and defense counsel of the prior experience of the juror in question and thereby allowed counsel to choose whether to allow that particular juror to sit in judgment of the case. Again, the Court chose not to do this.

There is apparently no dispute that under Virginia law this juror was qualified to sit on a jury. The Court having failed to exercise its prerogative to dismiss the juror, sua sponte, and having failed to notify counsel of that juror's past trial, a fact peculiarly within the Court's own knowledge, it is inconceivable that, after the trial of the Respondent and while the jury was deliberating, a manifest necessity for declaring a deadlocked jury and a mistrial could suddenly arise that would justify subordinating the Respondent's Fifth Amendment rights against double jeopardy.

The alleged facts elicited by the state trial Court at the hearing on April 15, 1980, raise the unpleasant specter of the necessity of questioning the motivations of a trial Court any time the propriety of its declaration of mistrial because of jury deadlock is challenged either on appeal or by a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. It is precisely because of the need to prevent this sort of unpleasant inquiry

into the motivations of trial Courts that the Circuit Courts of Appeals have required that manifest necessity appear in the record of the trial at the time the mistrial is declared, and that in cases of jury deadlock that the jury's own statement that it is deadlocked is the "crucial factor."

The inherent problem of inquiry into judicial motivation created by the lack of evidence on the record demonstrating that the jury is deadlocked is perhaps best stated by the Court in United States ex. rel. Russo v. Superior Court of New Jersey, 483 F.2d at p. 16, n. 15.

> "We cannot emphasize too strongly that there is nothing to lead us to suspect that the trial judge was guilty of ... manipulation. But the possibility exists and is a factor which we definitely must consider. The alternatives are to allow the discretion of the trial judge to go unchecked or to become embroiled in embarrassing inquiries into his motives in each particular case."

The only way to adequately resolve this dilemma is to require that the record clearly demonstrate that the jury is hopelessly deadlocked at the time the jury is dismissed - as is mandated by Webb, Russo, Lansdown, Horn and Arnold, supra. But that is precisely what was not done in the instant case.

The well-established judicial principle of double jeopardy is not only intended to prevent a defendant from twice being punished for the same offense, it is also intended to prevent the defendant from being twice jeopardized for the same offense. The reasons for strict adherence to the double jeopardy proscription of the Fifth Amendment are well set out in the following

two quotes from the recent Supreme Court opinions:

> "The State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty." Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-188, 78 S.Ct. 221, 22, 2 L.Ed. 2nd 199 (1957).

> "A power in government to subject the individual to repeated prosecutions for the same offense would cut deeply into the framework of procedural protections which the Constitution establishes for the conduct of a criminal trial. And society's awareness of the heavy personal strain which a criminal trial represents for the individual defendant is manifested in the willingness to limit the Government to a single criminal proceeding to vindicate its very vital interest in enforcement of criminal laws." United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479, 91 S.Ct. 547, 554, 27 L.Ed. 2d 543 (1969).

In cases involving jury deadlock, however, the State possesses an interest opposed to the interests of the criminal defendant set out above, i.e., the opportunity to prosecute a criminal defendant to the State's fullest capacity - vis a vis, the defendant's right to have a verdict rendered either in his favor or against him.

As early as 1824, this Court recognized these countervailing interests and, in United States v. Perez, supra, adopted a reasonable standard, i.e., manifest necessity, to insure the protection of both interests. It is precisely these standards which were not met by the trial Court on March 11, 1980, and for that reason, the Respondent respectfully submits that the hold-

ing of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit was correct.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, it is respectfully submitted that the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

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Counsel for Respondent.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Joseph S. Bambacus, Counsel for the Respondent in the captioned matter, and a member of the Bar of the Supreme Court of the United States, do hereby certify that on or before March 25, 1981, I mailed a copy of the foregoing Brief in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to Linwood T. Wells, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Supreme Court Building, Richmond, VA 23219 and to Marshall Coleman, Esquire, Attorney General of Virginia, Supreme Court Building, Richmond, VA 23219, counsel for Petitioners.

_____
Joseph S. Bambacus

RECEIVED
MAR 27 1981
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
SUPREME COURT, U.S.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1980

No. 80-1474

ANDREW J. WINSTON, Sheriff,
City of Richmond,

Aubrey M. Davis, Commonwealth's Attorney
for the City of Richmond,

CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND
DIVISION I

Petitioners,

v.

JOSEPH G. MOORE, JR.

Respondent.

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VIRGINIA:

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND, DIVISION I

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

V.

JOSEPH G. MOORE, JR.

Transcript Of Proceedings

Held Before

Judge James M. Lumpkin

On

Tuesday, April 15, 1980

Witness: No, I don't.

Atty: Thank you.

Comm: Judge, I have one more witness. I'd like to call Sheriff Johnson.

Judge: All right.

Clerk: Do you solomly swear that the evidence given to this court shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Sheriff: I do.

Comm: Will you tell the court please your name and where you're employed?

Sheriff: Franklin L. Johnson, United States Army retired, employed by the Sheriff's Department, City of Richmond.

Comm: Were you working in Judge Lumpkin's Court on March 10th, 1980, during the Joseph Moore trial?

Sheriff: Yes.

Comm: At the beginning of the trial, after the jury was chosen, did you recall anything unusual when the jury first came out, before the trial had even started?

Sheriff: Nothing too much, just tired.

Comm: Were there any complaints from any of the jurors at that time?

Sheriff: Not at that time.

Comm: Were there any complaints later on?

Sheriff: Later on, yes.

Comm: What happened?

Sheriff: We did unlock the back door and two of the deputies were at this door, and we cracked that door,

Atty: Well, that door was locked. That's the door from which prisoners come and go.

Sheriff: That's correct, sir.

Atty: So with the exception of the door that the judge uses to come and go which was covered by two deputies and the jury room, the courtroom was effectively sealed from anybody elses interference?

Sheriff: That's correct.

Atty: No one had access to it?

Sheriff: That's correct.

Atty: Did you ever indicate to his honor the fact that the lady was crying or had red eyes or anything?

Sheriff: No, not at that point.

Atty: And you didn't think it of significant importance to tell him that night or the next day, did you?

Sheriff: Well, I told him that they wanted to go home, one man said that he wanted to go home and he had to feed his sick wife.

Atty: But you didn't deem it of significant importance to tell the judge that some juror was emotionally upset or sick?

Sheriff: Well...No, but the judge here had been working with them in the courtroom it is very obvious, and they can see as well as you can can't they.

Atty: Thank you Mr. Johnson.

Carol: I have one more question. The next morning they said they were asking you about the appearance of the jurors

Judge: reached a verdict the evening before, they had not reached a verdict that morning, I sensed considerable discord in the jury and among the jurors. One of the 12 jurors had been tried in this courtroom on a drug charge some years earlier and the expungement statute had been effected, the effect of which was that she was not convicted. I recall also a drug case I had had 5 or 6 years ago with a jury and I believe that same juror was even present in the courtroom, as an interested spectator in the Jefferson jury case about 1972. At any rate she remained on the jury. I mention that because the consequence of all of this was my strong feeling that this jury was hung when the foreman said it was hung. Having never before experienced from jurors what had happened with these 2, as the transcript shows, I said to the jury then that I am going to excuse you in a moment but I have some remarks to address to two of the jurors, and I did not name names, but I knew that they knew of whom I spoke, and that it on pages 5, 6, and 7 of the transcript. I guess it is safe to characterize it as a chastizement of those two jurors. At any rate, at that time I discharged the jury and would do the very same today were it to arise. I otherwise concur in the argument presented by the Commonwealth's Attorney and see no need to repeat references to cases or other arguments. Motions, Mr. Bambaccus, are denied and the case is set with a jury tomorrow at 10:00 o'clock.

VIRGINIA:

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND,

DIVISION ONE

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

v.

JOSEPH G. MOORE

Transcript of the evidence and other incidents of the above when heard on March 11, 1980, before the Honorable James M. Lumpkin, Judge.

APPEARANCES:

Carol A. N. Breit,
Attorney for the Commonwealth

Joseph S. Bambacus, Esq.,
Attorney for the Defendant

consider its verdict, after which the jury returned into the Court and the following occurs:

THE COURT: Counsel waive the poll as to names?

MISS BREIT: The Commonwealth waives.

MR. BAMBACUS: The defense waives.

THE COURT: All right, Mr. Beatty, what is the situation?

(No response is heard)

THE COURT: We don't want to know any particulars of deliberations but, of course, the question is, have you reached a verdict?

MR. BEATTY: Your Honor, the jurors have not been able to reach a verdict.

THE COURT: All right, I'm going to excuse you in a moment, I'm sorry that you weren't able to reach a verdict because it's a case that -- in which there should have been a verdict.

I want to direct a remark or two to two of the jurors specifically who, along about

six o'clock last evening, notified the Sheriff that they couldn't stay.

Nobody told me about it until six o'clock and jury duty is a civic obligation. Wherever any juror has any responsibilities at home or otherwise we try to cooperate with the jury.

If you have to be excused on specific dates because of vacation or because of any reasonable reason, I don't know a Judge in this building who wouldn't accede to any reasonable request. But as I got the message about six o'clock, two of you simply couldn't stay any longer.

Well, I don't like that and jurors, like anybody else, are subject to rules and regulations regarding contempt of Court and while it is a rare thing that a juror has to stay at night there are times when it's necessary and there are times when there are jury cases day after day after day and it's necessary.

We try to be reasonable about it and I think I've been reasonable about it and -- with this jury and any other jury. As I say,

nobody told the jury officer to my knowledge, nobody told me, nobody told my Sheriff or anybody until six o'clock when two of you demanded to leave.

I don't like it, I don't appreciate it and if you're on a jury here, any of you, I want you to let the Sheriff or me know early in the morning whatever problems you may have at home or otherwise.

All right, thank you, you are excused.

NOTE: At this time the Court discharged the jury from further consideration of the case, after which the recording device ceases to operate. When it resumes late operation Counsel is already speaking:

MR. BAMBACUS: . . . . detective in the case.

THE COURT: Who is the detective.

MR. BAMBACUS: Detective Murphy.

V I R G I N I A:

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND,
DIVISION I

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

Plaintiff

v. F 11-193

JOSEPH G. MOORE, JR.

Defendant

PLEA OF FORMER JEOPARDY
AND
MOTION TO DISMISS

Comes now the defendant and moves the Court to dismiss the indictment in this action on the grounds that this defendant has been twice placed in jeopardy of the offense charged in the indictment in the case of Commonwealth of Virginia v. Joseph G. Moore tried on January 9, 1980, and again on March 10, 1980, and the trial scheduled in this Court on April 16, 1980, would violate the defendant's rights under the Double Jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States; the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States; as well as Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Virginia.

The defendant submits the attached statement of facts and memorandum of law in support of this motion.

_____
Joseph G. Moore

_____
Joseph S. Bambacus and
Stylian P. Parthemos
Counsel for the Defendant
605 Mutual Building
Richmond, Virginia 23219

STATE OF VIRGINIA

CITY OF RICHMOND, to-wit:

This day personally appeared before me, _____.

a Notary Public in and for the City and State aforesaid, JOSEPH G. MOORE, and made oath that the allegations contained in this motion are true.

Given under my hand this 21st day of March, 1980.

My Commission expires: January 31, 1982

/s/ Effie P. Dover
Notary Public

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I have this 24 day of March, 1980, hand delivered mailed a true and exact copy of the foregoing Plea of Former Jeopardy and Motion to Dismiss to Carol Breit, Assistant Commonwealth's Attorney for the City of Richmond to her office address, Office of the Commonwealth's Attorney, Second Floor, John Marshall Courts Building, 800 East Marshall Street, Richmond, Virginia 23219.

March 24, 1980

Honorable James M. Lumpkin, Judge
Circuit Court of the City of Richmond,
Division I
John Marshall Courts Building
800 East Marshall Street
Richmond, Virginia 23219

Re: Commonwealth of Virginia
v. Joseph G. Moore, Jr.
F 11-193

Dear Judge Lumpkin:

I am enclosing Motion to dismiss the indictment in the captioned case which has as its basis a violation of the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. I am enclosing a 16-page brief in support of this motion.

In the event the Court desires oral argument before ruling on the motion, I would like to have the argument as soon as possible. Your Honor's determination of the enclosed motion would constitute an exhaustion of State remedies, and in the unforeseeable event that Your Honor overrules the motion, I would want to apply for habeas relief in the appropriate forum. Likewise, I would like to know if the Court will insist upon the trial being held on April 16, 1980, as previously scheduled. If the Court will not continue the case pending determination of the issues raised, I would be compelled to schedule a hearing for a temporary restraining order pending resolution of the issues.

I tried to contact Your Honor with regard to the enclosed motion and was told by your clerk to file the motion and supporting brief, and I would be advised as to whether Your Honor would want oral argument and of the Court's ruling. I have been unable to file this motion sooner because I have been working on the legal research in addition to handling my trial schedule, and the brief was not completed until Friday afternoon, March 21, 1980.

Respectfully yours,

Joseph S. Bambacus

JSB/ed

encls.

cc: Ms. Carol Breit
Assistant Commonwealth's Attorney

Circuit Court
OF THE
City of Richmond

JAMES M. LUMPKIN
JUDGE

JOHN MARSHALL COURTS BUILDING
800 EAST MARSHALL STREET
RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 23219

April 10, 1980

Carol A. N. Breit, Esquire
Assistant Attorney for the Commonwealth
John Marshall Courts Building
800 East Marshall Street
Richmond, Virginia 23219

Joseph S. Bambacus, Esquire
Bambacus and Associates
605 Mutual Building
Richmond, Virginia 23219

Re: Commonwealth v. Joseph G. Moore, Jr.

Dear Ms. Breit and Mr. Bambacus:

I have reviewed the memoranda of law submitted by each of you, as well as my own trial notes.

The Statements of Facts are not in substantial agreement on critical factual issues. Hence a hearing will be held and Tuesday, April 15 at 3:00 P.M. appears the only feasible time.

Both sides should be prepared for trial April 16.

Very truly yours,

James M. Lumpkin

JML/np

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Richmond Division

JOSEPH G. MOORE, JR., Petitioner	)	
v.	)	Civil Action No.
ANDREW J. WINSTON, SHERIFF, CITY OF RICHMOND,	)	
AUBREY M. DAVIS, COMMONWEALTH'S ATTORNEY FOR THE CITY OF RICHMOND,	)	
and	)	
CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND, DIVISION I Respondents	)	

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND
APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER, PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND
PERMANENT INJUNCTION

Your petitioner, Joseph G. Moore, Jr., moves this Court for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to Title 28, Section 2254, U.S.C.A., and a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction and permanent injunction by reason of the following:

1. On December 3, 1979, the petitioner was indicted by a Grand Jury of the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond,Division I, pursuant to Section 18.2-91 of the Code of Virginia of 1950, as amended, for allegedly breaking and entering into the residence of Bill McGowan, 2623 Hanover Avenue, Apartment 1, Richmond, Virginia, with intent to commit larceny therein (Case No. F 11-193).

On January 9, 1980, the defendant was tried before a jury of the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond,Division I, and after the presentation of the evidence by both the Commonwealth and the defense, the jury was instructed, closing arguments of counsel were made and the jury retired for deliberation at approximately 5:00 o'clock p.m. At approximately 6:30 o'clock p.m. on that same date, after receiving word from the foreman of the jury that the

jury was unable to reach a verdict, and after advising counsel for the Commonwealth and for the defendant of the communication from the foreman, the Court summoned the jury into the courtroom, and after a brief colloquy before the Court with the foreman of the jury wherein the foreman voiced his opinion that the jury was deadlocked, the Court discharged the jury from rendering any further service in the case and a mistrial was declared.

3. Subsequent to the first declaration of mistrial on January 9, 1980, the defendant was again tried on the same indictment on March 10, 1980. The jury was impanelled and evidence was taken. With a few exceptions, the evidence at the trial of March 10, 1980, was essentially the same as the evidence at the trial on January 9, 1980. At the conclusion of all the evidence, the instructions to the jury and closing arguments, the jury retired for deliberation at approximately 4:35 o'clock p.m. At approximately 5:45 o'clock p.m., a communication was sent by the Jury to the Court that two of the jurors wanted to retire for the evening. After consulting with counsel for the Commonwealth and for the defendant, the Court recessed the jury for the evening at approximately 6:00 o'clock p.m., with instructions to reconvene at 10:00 o'clock a.m. to continue their deliberations.

4. The jury returned to the Court at 10:00 o'clock a.m. on the morning of March 11, 1980, and shortly thereafter the jury continued their deliberations. At approximately 10:50 o'clock a.m., counsel were summoned to the courtroom by the Court without any notice as to the purpose therefor, and without any consultation between the Court and counsel. Further counsel had no knowledge of the purpose for which the Court had reconvened. At that time the Court asked the foreman of the jury if the jury had been able to reach a verdict. The foreman stated that the jury had not reached a verdict. The Court did not even interrogate the Jury

foreman as to whether he believed the jury would be able to reach a verdict. Without any further interrogation of the jury panel, i.e., the other eleven members of the jury, or without any further interrogation of the individual members thereof, and without affording counsel for the defendant an opportunity to object, the Court discharged the jury and declared a mistrial. Immediately thereafter, the Court scheduled a third trial of the defendant upon the same indictment on April 16, 1980, at 10:00 o'clock a.m.

5. The petitioner has filed no petitions, applications or motions for relief except for a Plea of Former Jeopardy and Motion to Dismiss with a supporting brief in the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond, Division I, on March 24, 1980, a copy of said Plea of Former Jeopardy and Motion to Dismiss is hereto attached and made a part hereof as petitioner's Exhibit No. 1. On the morning of April 14, 1980, counsel for the petitioner received a letter from The Honorable James M. Lumpkin, Judge of the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond, Division I, advising counsel that the Statements of Facts are not in substantial agreement on critical factual issues. Further, The Honorable James M. Lumpkin has scheduled a hearing for Tuesday, April 15, 1980, at 3:00 o'clock p.m., notwithstanding that a transcript of the proceedings on the morning of March 11, 1980, was prepared by the official court reporter of the court from a recording of the proceedings at page 5 of which the pertinent colloquy between the Court and the jury foreman is set forth. A copy of the transcript of such proceedings is hereto attached and made a part hereof as petitioner's Exhibit No. 2. The Court further directed that both sides should be prepared for trial on April 16. A copy of the letter from The Honorable James M. Lumpkin is hereto attached and made a part hereof as though fully set out herein as petitioner's Exhibit No. 3.

6. The hearing scheduled for 3:00 o'clock p.m. on April 15, 1980, does not afford your petitioner an opportunity for injunctive relief or habeas relief in the event of an adverse ruling and the mere threat of being required to go to trial on the morning of

April 16, 1980, is violative of the petitioner's rights under the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States so as to entitle him to injunctive relief from being tried on April 16th pending disposition of this petition.

7. The petitioner alleges that he has exhausted his State remedies and that any adverse ruling on his Plea of Former Jeopardy and Motion to Dismiss is not appealable to the Supreme Court of Virginia for the reason that it is not a final Order and that he is entitled to initiate this proceeding as well as to the relief prayed for herein.

8. The grounds in support of this petition are;

a. The actions of the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond, Division I, as alleged in paragraphs 1 through 6 herein were such that the scheduled trial of the petitioner on April 16, 1980, violates the petitioner's rights under the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States in that the petitioner has been thrice placed in jeopardy of the offense charged in the indictment.

b. The discharge of the jury and the declaration of a mistrial on March 11, 1980, by the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond, Division I, as aforesaid, was not dictated by a manifest necessity.

c. The Circuit Court of theCity of Richmond, Division I, failed;

(i) to afford counsel for thepetitioner an opportunity for a timely objection to the discharge of the jury and declaration of a mistrial as well as an opportunity to be heard on the necessity therefor;

(ii) to ascertain the opinion of the jury foreman or the individual or collective opinion of the entire jury;

(iii) to afford the jury in both trials sufficient time to deliberate and to deal with the conflicting testimony of the Commonwealth's witnesses and their contradictions and to weigh the same against the evidence of the defendant; the Commonwealth having called seven (7) witnesses and the defendand having called five (5) witnesses, for a total of twelve (12) witnesses;

(iv) to consider that while the legal issues presented to the jury were relatively simple ones, namely, did the petitioner break and enter into the residence at 2623 Hanover Avenue, Apartment 1, in the daytime with intent to commit larceny therein, the approximately 2-1/4 hours of deliberation by the jury at the trial of March 10-11, 1980, as well as the 1-1/2 hour of deliberation at the trial on January 9, 1980, were not so lengthy as to raise even a suspicion that the case could not have been resolved by either jury if permitted to deliberate further, and there was no manifest necessity for the Court to discharge the jury and declare a mistrial, particularly when the inconsistent testimony of the seven witnesses called by the Commonwealth is considered together with the exhibits introduced by the Commonwealth and the defense. (See transcript of the evidence and other incidents of trial on January 9, 1980, hereto attached and made a part hereof as petitioner's Exhibit No. 4.);

(v) to advise counsel of the purpose for which the Court was reconvened at approximately 10:50 o'clock a.m. on March 11, 1980, and further, the Trial Court failed to advise counsel for the defendant of communications, if any, from the foreman of the jury to the Trial Court;

(vi) to consider that there was not the remotest possibility of any exhaustion on the part of the jury, they having deliberated for less than an hour on the morning of March 11, 1980, and nothing in the record would suggest an adverse impact which coercion of further deliberation might have had on the verdict;

(vii) to consider that the petitioner having previously been tried on the indictment as aforesaid on January 9, 1980, an even greater amount of caution, efficiency and obviousness was required of the Trial Court on March 11, 1980, prior to the discharge of the jury and the declaration of a mistrial, because the consequence to the petitioner of the action by the Court subjected the petitioner to yet a third trial;

(viii) that there was no declaration of opinion from any member of the jury, including the foreman, that the jury was deadlocked, and that the action taken by the Trial Court, sua sponte, deprived the petitioner of his right to a verdict, and has the same force and effect as an acquital of the petitioner.

d. That the refusal of the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond to delay or continue the third trial scheduled for April 16, 1980, requires that this Court enter a temporary restraining order and a preliminary and/or permanent injunction in order to

protect the petitioner's rights herein asserted.

e. Your petitioner is presently incarcerated in the Richmond City Jail and is being held there by the defendant, Andrew J. Winston, Sheriff of the City of Richmond, pursuant to Order of the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond, Division I.

Wherefore, your petitioner prays that this Court:

1. Enter a temporary restraining order, restraining the defendants from again trying the petitioner under the indictment aforesaid, and that such temporary restraining order be enlarged into a preliminary injunction and/or permanent injunction should the defendants persist in trying your petitioner for a third time prior to the disposition of the issues raised in this complaint.

2. That this Court grant the petitioner a writ of habeas corpus on the grounds that this petitioner has been twice put in jeopardy for the offense charged in the indictment pending in the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond, Division I.

Your petitioner, Joseph G. Moore, Jr., declares under penalty of perjury that the allegations contained in the foregoing petition for a writ of habeas corpus are true and correct to the best of his information, knowledge and belief.

Executed on this 15th day of April, 1980.

Joseph G. Moore, Jr.

Joseph G. Moore, Jr.

Joseph S. Bambacus
Bambacus and Associates
605 Mutual Building
Richmond, Virginia 23219
Counsel for Petitioner

STATE OF VIRGINIA
CITY OF RICHMOND, to-wit:

This day personally appeared before me, Effie P. Davis, a Notary Public in and for the City and State aforesaid, JOSEPH G. MOORE, and made oath that the allegations contained in this Petition and Application are true.

Given under my hand this 15th day of April, 1980.
My Commission expires: January 3, 1982.

Effie P. Davis
Notary Public

THE COURT: Let me talk with Mr. Garrett. Mr. Garrett, is it agreed that Webb, Rusoe, and Landsdown are the law?

MR. GARRETT: Off the top of my head, I would think they are, Your Honor. I haven't since yesterday afternoon had a chance to read all those cases.

THE COURT: Did you say yes?

MR. GARRETT: Yes, sir, I think that is the law.

THE COURT: Is it further agreed that there has been exhaustion?

MR. GARRETT: I'm not really sure there has been, Your Honor, for the reason -- Yesterday at three o'clock or shortly thereafter, Mr. Bambacus presented to the Virginia Supreme Court a writ for petition of habeas corpus, a petition for temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction and the subsequent permanent injunction. That was denied at 3:35 p.m. At that time the circuit court had not ruled on the motion to dismiss the indictment, on the grounds of double jeopardy, by Mr. Bambacus.

Now, the Supreme Court, when it came back, through Chief Justice I'Anson, and made its decision did not state why they ruled the way they did. It

through the habeas petition, not through interlocutory appeal.

THE COURT: It seems to me, Mr. Bambacus, that your verified complaint in this Court, or petition, I should say, fully states the case under Rusoe and Webb. I am not sure that Mr. Garrett would disagree that the verified petition fully states a Webb and Rusoe case.

Now, under Webb and Rusoe I would be obligated to enter a temporary restraining order. It is not clear from what you and Mr. Garrett tell me that you have exhausted your state remedies, and that is a requirement of the statute and of the law, that you first exhaust your state remedies. That, frankly, is the only question I have.

I have no question about your petition fitting the requisites of Webb and Rusoe. And I think it's agreed that Webb and Rusoe correctly state the law, along with Landsdown.

MR. BAMBACUS: May I address the Court?

THE COURT: Yes, sir. What proof do you have -- Mr. Garrett, if you'll give way, I'll find out exactly what proof he has that he has exhausted state remedies.

MR. BAMBACUS: Your Honor, the motion to

THE COURT: In light of the additional --

MR. GARRETT: In light of the additional fact that the circuit court has denied his motion to dismiss the indictment.

THE COURT: Let me see if you agree with me. I think I asked you this before. Do you agree with me that if the facts are as set forth in the petition that Webb and Rusoe would direct and require that I issue a writ of habeas corpus?

MR. GARRETT: It's been some time since I read those cases, but I believe that's what those cases say.

THE COURT: Sir?

MR. GARRETT: It's been a while since I read those cases. I believe that's what those cases say.

THE COURT: Under those circumstances, I'm going to issue a temporary restraining order for a limited period of time, until tomorrow morning at 9:30, to enable Mr. Bambacus to either file a new petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the Supreme Court of Virginia or a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the circuit court, with the requirement that if that is adverse that he appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia.

presented by way of petition and supporting arguments.

THE COURT: Let me interrupt one second. Do you concur, sir?

MR. GARRETT: Yes, sir.

THE MARSHAL: Stand up, please, when you're addressing the court.

MR. GARRETT: Yes, sir, I concur that exhaustion has been accomplished.

MR. SHUFORD: Now, if Your Honor please, it seems also at this point that the orderly administration might be helped if I took cognizance of the fact that no answer has been filed to the petition. The court had made some statements yesterday which I heard for the first time, my involement in the case being nil up to that time, that it was thoroughly familiar with the factual allegations of the petition and with the cases of Rusoe and Webb, which I attempted to familiarize myself with, and that if the facts, as I understood Your Honor, if the facts as alleged in the petition were correct, the court was constrained to follow Rusoe and Webb and grant this unusual remedy, relief.

THE COURT: In which Mr. Garrett concurred if those facts were correct, then it meets the requirements of Rusoe and Webb and that Rusoe and Webb are the controlling law.

RECEIVED
MAR 16 1981
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
SUPREME COURT, U.S.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

ANDREW J. WINSTON,
et. al.,
Petitioners,

v. Case No. 80-1474

JOSEPH G. MOORE,
Respondent.

MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
and
~~EXTENSION OF TIME FOR RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION~~

Comes now the respondent, Joseph G. Moore, by counsel, and moves the Court to authorize the defense of this appeal in forma pauperis, pursuant to Rule 53 of the Rules of the United States Supreme Court as well as an extension of time from the granting of this motion to file his brief in opposition. As and for his grounds for this motion, your respondent says as follows:

1. This action is an appeal from a ruling of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirming the ruling of the Unites States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Richmond Division, granting your respondent a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to Title 28, Section 2254 of the United States Code, as amended;

2. That your respondent is unable to pay fees and costs, including printing costs, or any part thereof, or to give security therefor for the defense of this action;

3. That your respondent filed an affidavit in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit wherein he made a full and complete disclosure of his assets and sources of income; and pursuant to said affidavit, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit granted your respondent leave to proceed with the defense of that appeal in forma pauperis and appointed Joseph S. Bambacus as counsel for your respondent;

4. That as a result of the foregoing, your respondent believes that he is entitled to redress under Rule 53 of the Rules

of the United States Supreme Court.

WHEREFORE, your respondent hereby moves the Court for leave to defend this appeal in forma pauperis pursuant to Rule 53 of the Rules of the United States Supreme Court, and an extension of 30 days from the granting of this motion within which to file his brief in opposition.

JOSEPH G. MOORE

By _____
Counsel

_____
Joseph S. Bambacus
Bambacus & Parthemos
605 Mutual Building
Richmond, Virginia 23219

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I have this 10th day of March, 1981, mailed a true and exact copy of the foregoing Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis and Extension of Time for Respondent's Brief in Opposition to Linwood T. Wells, Jr., Counsel for Petitioners, to his office address, 900 Fidelity Building, 830 East Main Street, Richmond, Virginia 23219.

_____

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

ANDREW J. WINSTON,
et. al.,
Petitioners,

v. Case No. 80-1474

JOSEPH G. MOORE,
Respondent.

AFFIDAVIT

This day personally appeared before the undersigned Notary Public, Joseph S. Bambacus, who after being duly sworn, doth depose and say as follows:

1. That I was court-appointed counsel for the Respondent, Joseph G. Moore, in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in defense of an appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court of the Eastern District of Virginia, Richmond, Division, granting to the respondent a writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to Title 28, Section 2254 of the United States Code, as amended.

2. That the respondent filed an affidavit in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit wherein he made a full and complete disclosure of his assets and sources of income; and pursuant to said affidavit, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, authorized the respondent to proceed with the defense of that appeal in forma pauperis and appointed Joseph S. Bambacus as counsel for the respondent.

3. That there has been no change in the assets or income of the respondent since the filing of the affidavit by the respondent in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the respondent having been in the custody of the Commonwealth of Virginia continually for the past twelve months.

4. That the respondent is unable to pay fees and costs, including printing costs or any part thereof, or to give security

therefor for the defense of this appeal.

5. That by reason of the foregoing, the respondent is entitled to proceed pursuant to Rule 53 of the Rules of the United States Supreme Court.

Joseph S. Bambacus

STATE OF VIRGINIA

CITY OF RICHMOND, to-wit:

I, Deborah C. Bowen, a Notary Public in and for the City/County of Richmond, in the State of Virginia, do hereby certify that Joseph S. Bambacus, whose name is signed to the foregoing Affidavit, has acknowledged the same before me in my City/County of Richmond aforesaid.

Given under my hand this 10th day of March, 1981.

My commission expires: March 1, 1982.

Deborah C. Bowen
Notary Public

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I have this 10th day of March, 1981, mailed a true and exact copy of the foregoing Affidavit to Linwood T. Wells, Jr., counsel for the Petitioners, to his office address, 900 Fidelity Building, 830 East Main Street, Richmond, Virginia 23219.